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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-THE ABANDONMENT OF THE "MERE Evi-
DENCE"I RULE: ANOTHER STEP TowARD RE-EMPHASIZING PRIVACY As THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT STANDARD
On the morning of March 17, 1962, an armed robber entered business
premises in Baltimore, Maryland and took approximately $363. Attracted
by shouts, two cab drivers in the vicinity followed the man from the scene and
notified the company radio dispatcher that the robber-a Negro about 5 feet
8 inches tall, wearing a light cap and a dark jacket-had entered a house at
2111 Cocoa Lane. The police, having had this information relayed to them
while proceeding to the scene of the robbery, arrived at the house within minutes
and were permitted to enter the premises by defendant Hayden's wife. She of-
fered no objection.' After ascertaining that no male was hiding on the first
floor, three officers spread out to search the basement and upstairs areas.
Hayden was found in the upstairs bedroom feigning sleep, and after it was
ascertained that there was no one in the basement, Hayden was placed under
arrest. One officer on the upstairs level, hearing the continuous running of the
toilet in an adjacent bathroom, found and seized a sawed-off shotgun and a
pistol from the flush tank. Ammunition for the guns was found and seized in a
search of the bedroom. In the interim, the officer searching the basement dis-
covered a jacket, a pair of pants and a leather belt in a washing machine and
seized these items as fitting the description of the clothing worn by the robber.
All the seized items were received as evidence without objection.2 The trial court,
sitting without a jury, found the defendant Hayden guilty of armed robbery.
After unsuccessful post-conviction proceedings in the state court, Hayden
sought and was denied federal habeas corpus relief in the District Court of
Maryland. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
versed, holding that the clothing seized was improperly admitted in evidence
because the items had evidential value only, and therefore were not lawfully
subject to seizure.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the fourth amendment allows an intrusion upon privacy incident to an otherwise
reasonable search because there is no viable reason to distinguish intrusions
1. Warden, Maryland Penetentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n.3 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Instant case]. The Court determined that the consent to search by defendant's
wife was not in issue because the officers would have been "justified in entering and search-
ing the house for the felon, for his weapons and for the fruits of the robbery" when in "hot
pursuit" of the suspect. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), was cited as
authority for this "hot pursuit" exception.
2. Id. at 297-98 n.4. It is significant to note that defendant challenged the competency
of his trial counsel, but the state claimed he had waived the search and seizure issue by not
making a timely objection at the trial. Brief for Petitioner at 52-65, Instant case, 387 U.S.
294 (1967). The Court, however, gave footnote treatment to the waiver question by remark-
ing that since the state had passed on the merits of his claim in post-conviction proceedings,
the deliberate bypass rule had no application. Nowhere in the opinion was the experienced
counsel issue treated. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
3. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966).
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to secure "mere evidence" from intrusions to secure fruits of the crime, instru-
mentalities, or contraband. Warden, Maryland Penetentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294 (1967).
The need for protection against "unreasonable searches and seizures" be-
came apparent in England and the American Colonies before the American
Revolution. Abuses of the power to search and to seize had become notorious. 4
The general warrant, issued by the Secretary of State, essentially authorized an
unlimited exploratory search for evidenceY This practice was finally condemned
in the landmark decision of Entick v. Carrington,G where Lord Camden rejected
the use of the general warrant and proclaimed that "the great end for which
men entered into society was to secure their property."7 He recommended the
essential safeguards of requiring particularity and probable cause,8 which were
later incorporated in the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
He seemed to be emphasizing the importance of an individual's privacy when
he stated: "Whether this proceedeth from the gentleness of the law toward
criminals or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to
the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say."' 0 The issue was truly
joined with respect to the "mere evidence" doctrine in the case of Boyd v.
United States." There the government conducted an in rem proceeding to
establish the forfeiture of certain goods alleged to have been fraudulently im-
ported into the United States. A statute enabled the government to obtain a
court order requiring the claimants of such goods to produce invoices for the
court's inspection.12 The Court held this statute to be unconstitutional and
such evidence to be inadmissible.' 3 Where a man's private papers are produced
pursuant to a court order or any governmental compulsion, it was said that
"the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into one another"' 4 in pro-
hibiting the admission of such evidence. The Court pointed out that:
[T]he "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth
Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a
4. See generally N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution 22-105 (1937); J. Landynski, Searches and Seizures and
the Supreme Court 19-40 (1966).
5. For further discussion of the history of the fourth amendment, see generally Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-65 (1959); and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717,
726-29 (1961); and Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-86 (1965).
6. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
7. Id. at 1066.
8. Id. at 1067.
9. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
10. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1073.
11. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
12. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 193, § 5, 18 Stat. 186.
13. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 638.
14. Id. at 630.
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man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is con-
demned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a 
man "in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth
Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreason-
able search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.'5
By this language the Court created a close interrelationship between "unrea-
sonable searches and seizures" and the compulsory self-incrimination which
may result. As might have been expected, the intricacies of Boyd precipi-
tated varied judicial interpretations. 16 The Boyd decision was subsequently
codified 17 in the Espionage Act of 1917,18 which authorized the seizure of
contraband, instrumentalities and fruits of the crime. Shortly thereafter, in
1921, the "mere evidence" rule was finally formulated in Gouled v. United
States.'9 There the defendant was suspected of defrauding the United States
in certain government contracts. Personal papers were seized, both secretly by
an intelligence agent pretending to be a friend of the defendant, and also inci-
dent to a lawfully issued search warrant. The Supreme Court adopted the
well-known "Gouled Rule," declaring that search warrants may be used to
gain access to a man's home or office only to seize contraband, 20 instrumentali-
ties, 21 or fruits of the crime,22 but not to seize materials of a "merely evi-
dentiary" nature.23 The Court relied heavily on the language of the Boyd
opinion, where it was said that search warrants
may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure
may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may
15. Id. at 633.
16. Compare United States v. Wilson, 163 F. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1908) with United States
v. Mills, 185 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911). The former case introduced a concept that the
seizure was justified if the evidence was necessary, but the latter case seemingly disregarded
this doctrine
17. Note, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 Geo. LJ. 593, 600-01
(1966).
18. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 2, 40 Stat. 228. This enactment for the first time
granted general authority for the issuance of search warrants limited by the following
classifications of seizable items:
1. When the property was stolen or embezzled in violation of a law of the
United States ....
2. When the property was used as the means of committing a felony; in
which case it may be taken on the warrant from any house or other place which
it is concealed, or from the possession of the person by whom it was used in the
commission of the offense, or from any person in whose possession it may be.
3. When the property, or any paper, is possessed, controlled, or used in
violation (of this statute] ....
19. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
20. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) (forged draft classification
cards) ; Honig v. United States, 208 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1953) (counterfeiting plates).
21. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (ledgers and utility bills
in an illegal liquor operation) ; Leahy v. United States, 272 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1959), iotion,
to withdraw appearance granted, 364 U.S. 940 (1961) (wagering paraphenalla).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Dornblut, 261 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360
U.S. 912 (1959) (a five dollar bill received from a sale of heroin).
23. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. at 309. For a discussion of the categories of
seizable items, see R. Davis, Federal Searches and Seizures 37-42 (1964).
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have in the property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it,
or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the
property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken.24
The Gouled Rule has since been codified in Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.2 5
Prior to Mapp v. Ohio26 in 1961,, the "mere evidence" question generated
little interest among the individual states. Wolf v. Colorado2 7 had held that the
basic fourth amendment protections were fundamental to a "'concept of ordered
liberty' and as such enforceable against the States through the Due Process
Clause." 28 However, there the Court did not consider the exclusionary rule,
which requires that all evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure be
excluded from use in a criminal trial, to be an "essential ingredient" 20 to the
fourth amendment protection. Therefore, not until Mapp had declared that
the exclusionary rule henceforth would be applicable to the states did the
"mere evidence" limitation upon searches and seizures become relevant to
the states. The courts have had difficulty grappling with the subtle distinc-
tions inherent in this restriction. In United States v. Guido,30 the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that shoes worn during a robbery were a means of
committing the crime. The Supreme Court of Oregon in State v. Chinn, held
that a camera, soiled bed sheets and empty beer bottles were instruments in the
commission of statutory rape. The United States Supreme Court in Marron v.
United States32 held that the seizure of certain ledgers and utility bills con-
nected with the operation of an illegal liquor business was justified since these
were instrumentalities of the crime. Some five years later, in United States v.
Lefkowitz,33 the Court in an almost identical fact situation found the products
of such seizures to be "merely evidentiary."3 4
Since the Mapp decision at least three state courts have refused to follow
24. Id.
25. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b) provides:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any property
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) Possessed, controlled, or designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 957.
26. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
27. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
28. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 650.
29. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. at 29.
30. 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1958). See also Robinson v. United States, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 919 (1960) (Items of clothing were considered means of com-
mitting a crime.).
31. 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962). See also Schweinefuss v. Commonwealth, 395
S.W.2d 370 (Ky. 1965) (Washing pans and utensils, mouthwash, vaseline, towels, cards used
by prostitutes, money bags, and prophylactic contraceptive devices were held to be means of
committing prostitution.).
32. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
33. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
34. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 235-38 (1960), rehearing denied, 362 U.S.
984 (1960), the United States Supreme Court recognized that the inconsistency in these two
cases "cannot be satisfactorily reconciled."
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the "mere evidence" restriction,35 and several states have abandoned this limita-
tion on seizures by statute.3 6 However, the abiding proscription that general ex-
ploratory searches to secure evidence against a person violated the fourth amend-
ment was uniformly maintained by courts on all levels. 37 It has been stated that
the Supreme Court has never resolved a non-documentary "mere evidence" ques-
tion.38 Schmerber v. California 9 set the stage for a definitive declaration by the
Supreme Court regarding the "mere evidence" distinction. In that case, the de-
fendant was hospitalized following an accident involving an automobile which he
apparently had been driving. The defendant was arrested upon probable cause
that he had been driving while intoxicated. Incident to that arrest, and over the
objection of the defendant, a hospital physician was directed to take a blood
sample. The report of the blood test, indicating that the defendant was intoxi-
cated at the time of the accident, was admitted into evidence and the defendant
was convicted. The United States Supreme Court, affirming the conviction, con-
sidered constitutional issues presented by the fourth and fifth amendments. It
first discussed the scope of the fifth amendment protection, stating that "the
privilege protects an accused only from being compelled to testily against himself,
or otherwise provide the state with evidence of a testimonial or communicative
nature . ,,40 It distinguished between the accused's compelled submission to
a blood test or any other exhibition of his physical characteristics as contrasted
to the compulsory disclosure of knowledge41 that he may have. Later, having
decided that there were no fifth amendment implications in the case, the Court
held that this intrusion into the human body, incident to a valid arrest and
conducted under reasonable circumstances, was not prohibited by the fourth
amendment. Thus it had carved out an exception to the traditional " [1] imita-
tions on the kinds of property which may be seized under warrant .... ,42 The
Court continued:
35. People v. Thayer, 63 Cal. 2d 635, 408 P.2d 108, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1966); State
v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 504, 213 A.2d 185 (1965); People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238
N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
36. Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, Vermont, California, Nebraska, New Jersey, Nevada
and New York have enacted provisions allowing the seizure of "mere evidence." N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 792 (1958), as amended, § 792 (Supp. 1967), may be cited as typical:
The following property may be ordered seized under a search warrant:
(4) property constituting evidence of a crime or tending to show that a
particular person committed a crime.
The constitutionality of New York's provision has been discussed in two New York
Supreme Court decisions, and a conflict of opinion was expressed. Compare People v. Carroll,
38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640 (Sup. Ct. 1963), with People v. Grossman, 45 Misc.
2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (Sobel, J.), rev'd, 27 A.D.2d 572, 276 N.Y.S.2d
168 (2d Dept. 1966), rev'd, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 283 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1967). See also N. Sobel, Cur-
rent Problems in the Law of Search and Seizure 87-97 (1964).
37. See generally Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 9-16, Instant case,
387 U.S. 294 (1967).
38. Brief for Petitioner at 20-23, Instant case, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
39. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
40. Id. at 761. (Emphasis added.).
41. Id. at 761 n.5.
42. Id. at 768.
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We begin with the assumption that once the privilege against self-
incrimination has been found not to bar compelled intrusions into the
body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content, the Fourth Amend-
ment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as
such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circum-
stances, or which are made in an improper manner.
43
Although the Court chose to defer discussion of the "mere evidence" im-
plications in Schmerber, the clearer definition given the scope of fifth amend-
ment protection, as one aspect of the interrelationship described in Boyd,44 rend-
ers the Court's decision in the instant case somewhat predictable.
Accepting the invitation of the Fourth Circuit to "reexamine and reinter-
pret"45 the "mere evidence" doctrine, the United States Supreme Court stressed
in the instant case that the underlying resolution of the fourth amendment as
adopted by our forefathers was to secure privacy. Turning to the "mere
evidence" distinction, Mr. Justice Brennan, delivering the majority opinion,4 0
asserted that its revival "is attributable more to chance than considered judg-
ment."147 With profound impatience, Justice Brennan took note of the confusion
spawned by the "mere evidence" limitation and remarked "that it is questionable
whether it affords meaningful protection."48 The Court stated that the frequently
used distinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities 40 involves a
"hair-splitting question"5 0 and stressed instead the reasonableness of the
search. While discarding the "mere evidence" limitation, the Court reiterated the
constitutional safeguards of probable cause, particularity, and the intervention
of a neutral and detached magistrate for the issuance of a lawful search war-
rant.5 1 The Court emphasized the irrelevance of traditional property concepts,
as they relate to the scope of seizable property, which had developed as a result
of the Boyd decision. Recalling Silverman v. United States," which recognized
that "inherent Fourth Amendment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms
of ancient niceties of tort or real property law," 53 the majority noted that the
superior property interest theory has been abandoned by the Court itself.
5 4
43. Id.
44. See generally Comment, The Fourth and Fifth Amendments-Dintensions of an
"Intimate Relationship," 13 U.C.LA.L. Rev. 857 (1966); Note, Evidentiary Searches: The
Rule and The Reason, 54 Geo. L.J. 593 (1966); Comment, Limitations on the Seizure of
"Evidentiary Objects"-A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. Chi. L. Rev. 319 (1953). See
also 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2184, 2264 (3d ed. 1940), and 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§§ 2184, 2264 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961).
45. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d at 655.
46. Mr. justice Brennan wrote for five members of the Court. Mr. Justice Black
concurred in the result without expressing an opinion. The opinions of the other members
are fully discussed in the text.
47. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 308.
48. Id. at 309.
49. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text for the distinction between "mere
evidence" and instrumentalities of the crime.
50. Id., quoting from J. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's Land in the Criminal
Law, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 474, 479 (1961).
51. Id. at 309-10. See generally Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
52. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
53. Id. at 511.
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"Searches and seizures," the Court continued, "may be 'unreasonable' within the
Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior property
interest at common law.'55 By historically tracing the available remedies to
recover illegally seized items, the Court indicated the radical change in proce-
dures that has occurred since Entick v. Carrington.56 Now "suppression of
evidence does not in itself necessarily entitle the aggrieved person to its return,
... [and] the introduction of 'mere evidence' does not in itself entitle the State
to its retention." 57
Thus, the Court fixed squarely on the fourth amendment guarantee of
privacy and established the individual right to privacy in one's own home under
any circumstances except where a search is both reasonable and justified. The
majority agreed with the lower court's determination that the search conducted
was a reasonable one. 58 Therefore, the Court's determination rested strictly on
the "mere evidence" question. The disputed evidence seized in the instant case
was adjudged to be tangible evidence as distinguished from "testimonial or
communicative" evidence, the latter being protected by the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 9 The Court did not feel compelled to con-
sider the consequences where the evidence seized could be defined as "testimonial
or communicative" as described in Schmerber v. California.60 It is important to
note that with respect to "tangible mere evidence," the Court has determined
that no meaningful value reflected by the fourth amendment's adoption is
enhanced by the continued life of this restriction.
Mr. Justice Fortes and the Chief Justice concurred in the result only, and
in a separate opinion expressed concern that "the court today needlessly
destroys, root and branch, a basic part of liberty's heritage," 61 by driving "an
enormous and dangerous hole in the Fourth Amendment to accommodate a
specific and reasonable exception." 62 It was argued that total repudiation
of the "mere evidence" rule was unnecessary since the search and seizure could
be sustained in terms of the "hot pursuit" exception.63 "Searches under each of
these exceptions," it was remarked, "have, until today, been confined to those
essential to fulfill the purpose of the exception . . ..,64 Justice Fortes suggested
54. See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Parenthetically, the almost
total abandonment of property concepts in the law of search and seizure in the instant
case will require that the Court reevaluate past proscriptions against eavesdropping ac-
complished by means of physical intrusion. Alluding to a trespass in eavesdropping cases
no longer is a satisfactory analysis. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), is an
instance where the Court held that the implementation of a microphone with a spike about
one foot long, inserted under a baseboard until it struck a "sounding board," was a viola-
tion of the fourth amendment.
55. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 304.
56. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
57. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 307-08.
58. Id. at 298.
59. Id. at 302-03.
60. Id. See Scbmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 762-4.
61. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 312.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 310-12.
64. Id. at 310.
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that only a limited exception to the "mere evidence" rule is warranted, say-
ing: "I agree that the use of identifying clothing worn in the commission of a
crime and seized during 'hot pursuit' is within the spirit and intendment of the
hot pursuit exception to the search warrant requirement." o
In a lone dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas referred to an absolute zone of
privacy "that may not be invaded by the police through raids, by the legislature
through laws, or by the magistrates through the issuance of warrants."006 He
asserted that a search for and seizure of "mere evidence" falls within this
absolute zone of privacy, and there simply can be no exceptions to this rule.
This hypothesis was derived from an exhaustive examination of the history of
the fourth amendment, tracing its origin as far back as the decision of Entick v.
Carrington.7 He especially recalled the debate of the constitutional authors
regarding the drafting of the fourth amendment, arguing that the final draft of
the amendment indicates an intention to establish an inviolate zone of privacy
in the first clause and also to establish a second zone subject to intrusion by
guarded exceptional means such as a search warrant.68 His opinion stressed the
fifth amendment aspect of the interplay between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments as discussed in Boyd. Framing his own question, he queried whether "the
Government, though armed with a proper search warrant or though making
a search incident to arrest, may seize, and use, at the trial, testimonial evidence
whether it would otherwise be barred by the Fifth Amendment or would be
free from such strictures." 69 Having limited his consideration to this particular
question, he was compelled to return to his dissent in Schmerber v. California,70
and contended that even "tangible" evidence, such as clothing, "taken from a
person without his consent and used as ... evidence, violates the Fifth Amend-
ment.' '71 His position is that the fourth amendment absolutely bans the seizure
of any "mere evidence" and that seized items may not be admitted into evidence,
not only by virtue of the fact of the illegal seizure, but also because such an
admission would violate the fifth amendment as he has defined it.
Initially, it is interesting to note the development of the relationship be-
tween the fourth and fifth amendments in the formulation of the "mere evidence"
rule. It was in Boyd that these two amendments first were interrelated, laying
the foundation for what has been called the "mere evidence" rule. In Justice
Douglas' careful analysis of the language of the fourth amendment, he develops
the hypothesis that the fourth and fifth amendments should each stand alone.
The former provides absolute protection against the seizure of mere evidence,
and the latter prevents the subsequent use of such evidence in a criminal prose-
65. Id. at 312.
66. Id. at 313.
67. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 2 Wils. 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).
68. Instant Case, 387 U.S. at 313.
69. Id. at 319.
70. 384 U.S. 757, 778-79 (1966).
71. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 320.
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cution.72 The majority of the Court in the instant case has chosen to redefine
the scope of the protection of the fourth amendment independent of the fifth
amendment. They have adjusted the focus of the fourth amendment on the
reasonableness of the search, 73 without passing on the question "whether there
are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the
object of a reasonable search and seizure." 74 The seizure of merely evidentiary,
self-incriminating documents, even though accompanied by a strict adherence
to the constitutional safeguards set out in the fourth amendment, probably will
be struck down as a violation of the fifth amendment protection as presently
defined. 75 And the Court, implying that the Schmerber definition will survive,
has followed its criteria in other decisions rendered this last term.76
Moreover, although the Court chose not to discuss the recurrent argument
that the recent developments in criminal procedure have inhibited effective law
enforcement, this decision reflects a need to clarify the permissable bounds of a
very important investigative tool. The United States Supreme Court, in Miranda
v. Arizona,77 emphasized that law enforcement officers ought to rely upon
scientific means of criminal investigation rather than seeking to elicit admissions
of guilt from the mouths of the accused.78 A denial of the right to search for and
seize tangible evidence, even in a reasonable situation, places a shackle on the
same means of investigation encouraged in the Miranda decision. It is sub-
72. In his dissent, Justice Douglas outlines his constitutional philosophy regarding
the fourth and fifth amendments by stating:
The existence of that choice [i.e.: whether to open one's private effects (apart
from contraband and the like) to the police or to keep their contents a secret and
their integrity inviolate] is the very essence of the right to privacy. Without it the
Fourth Amendment and the Fifth are ready instruments for the police state that
framers sought to avoid.
Instant case, 387 U.S. at 325.
73. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court also strongly emphasized
the importance of securing the individual's constitutional right of privacy.
74. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 303.
75. Admittedly this might suggest that the Boyd decision still has effect with
respect to private papers, especially those which involve "knowledge" of the accused
regarding the alleged crime. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 761 n.5, 763 n.7.
Moreover the Solicitor General and Amicus Curiae argued that Boyd is still good law
insofar as it was basically a Fifth Amendment case. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, at 6-7, Instant case, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
But an interesting argument may be made that Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
extends the Court's repudiation of the "mere evidence" limitation even to the fruits of eaves-
dropping procedures. A claim was made that New York's permissive eavesdrop statute, N.Y.
Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a, violated the fourth amendment by authorizing "'general searches'
for 'mere evidence.'" Id. at 44. Even considering the factual context in Berger, the Court
swiftly disposed of this contention adversely to petitioner's claim merely by citing Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden in footnote two. Id. Therefore, an inference may be
made, regardless of its persuasiveness, that this footnote extends the abrogation of the
"mere evidence" limitation beyond tangible evidence to evidence of a testimonial nature.
If this be so, the severance of the fourth and fifth, amendments of the Boyd interplay seems
complete.
76. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
77. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
78. Id. at 481. There the Court pointed out that "while protecting individual rights,
[it] has always given ample latitude to law enforcement agencies in the legitimate exercise of
their duties."
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mitted that with respect to clothing worn in the commission of a felony, even
though not taken from the person himself, 70 there should be no doubt of the
reasonableness or propriety of such a seizure.
However, the most significant feature of the Hayden decision is that the
United States Supreme Court finally responded to the great need for clarification
in this confused, if not chaotic, area. Those who feared the impending demise
of the "mere evidence" rule have argued that the possibility of a carte blanche
authority to conduct "fishing expeditions" would result, making search and
seizure a method of discovery. But this danger may be avoided if the standard
of reasonableness is strictly maintained.80 When "mere evidence" is sought, the
courts will require probable cause that the evidence will "aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction."8' Furthermore, now that the confusion has been
abated, the courts will be afforded a clearer picture of each particular case to
determine whether or not those constitutional safeguards have been maintained.
Thus, the Hayden decision should have very healthy results.
Finally, one might speculate as to the effect of this decision on criminal
prosecution at the federal level. In essence, what the Court has done is to
broaden the constitutional basis of permissible searches and seizures. However,
this in no way mandates that the Supreme Court, in its supervisory capacity,8 2
make similar rules for the federal courts. Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure is a product of the Court,8 3 and the Court must decide
whether to expand the breadth of the Rule to the full scope allowed in the
Hayden case. It is highly probable, however, that some semblance of the Hayden
rule will be codified because of the Court's obvious impatience with the prior
situation. With this, the many years of confusion will hopefully have come to an
end.
ROBERT B. CONKLIN
79. Respondent argued that there is a distinction between seizing clothing from the
person of the accused and seizing that same clothing after disrobement. Judge Bryan, dis-
senting in the circuit court of appeals decision, asserted that "the instantaneous immunization"
by disrobement of clothing worn during the crime from seizure is hardly founded in sound
logic. Hayden v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d at 656.
80. Instant case, 387 U.S. at 307.
81. Id.
82. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), where the Court determined that the
constitutional standard of the fourth amendment, made applicable to the states by Mapp,
was the reasonableness of the search and seizure. In Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443, 449 n.6 (1965), the Court indicated that it has not yet decided whether other
federal standards in the area of search and seizure are constitutionally obligatory upon the
states. Recalling the difference between constitutional and supervisory rules discussed in
Ker, it may be considered reasonable to retain Rule 41(b) limitations on the federal level
of prosecution.
83. Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1964).
